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Software Classification (NASA) 
Governing Document:  NASA Procedural Requirements 7150.2B NASA 
Software Engineering Requirements 
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Software Classification (AFRC) 
Governing Document: DPR-7150.2 Armstrong Software Engineering 
Requirements 
•  Software Classification (either Safety Critical “-S” or Non-Safety Critical) 
–  Class I:  Catastrophic 
–  Class II:  Critical 
–  Class III:  Minor  (not applicable for Safety Critical Software) 
–  Class IV:  Negligible  (not applicable for Safety Critical Software) 
•  Software Criticality (determined using a Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
preformed during the system architectural development) 
–  Safety Critical:  any condition, event, operation, process, equipment, or system that could 
cause or lead to severe injury, major damage, or mission failure if performed or built 
improperly, or allowed to remain uncorrected. 
–  Non-Safety Critical: anything that is not Safety Critical 
•  Categories of requirements include the following: 
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•  Compliance 
•  Project formulation 
•  Software life cycle 
•  Software plans 
•  Software requirements 
•  Software design 
•  Peer reviews/inspections 
•  Software implementation 
•  Software testing 
•  Software verification and validation  
•  Software configuration  
•  Software measurement 
•  Software operations, maintenance, and 
retirement 
  
What Are Verification and Validation? 
(… and how are they different?) 
•  V&V testing looks at the entire system, both software and 
hardware, as the system to be tested 
•  Verification 
–  Proving that the system does exactly what it was designed to do 
–  Follow the specification (even if that is not the right thing to do) 
•  Validation 
–  Proving that the behavior of the system is acceptable 
•  Configuration control is a key element 
–  Control the thing being tested, document all changes 
–  Document results of all tests conducted 
•  Types of testing 
–  Software-in-the-loop (SIL) 
–  Brass-board-in-the-loop (BBIL) 
–  Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) 
–  Iron-bird or airplane-in-the-loop (AIL)  
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Background 
•  X-29 - SIL, HIL, AIL (Class I-S – 1984-1992) 
–  Low AOA and high AOA control law development & control law 
improvements 
–  XAIDS ARINC 429 bus monitor, (2) 8 channel stripchart 
recorders, limited simulation recording capability 
–  (2) RC engineers required during test (pilot and stripchart 
marker) 
–  (2) RC engineers reviewed test data 
•  X-33 - SIL, BBIL, HIL (Class I-S – never flown) 
–  Lab development only, program was ended before V&V testing 
was completed 
–  Hardware 1553 bus monitors & extensive recording capability 
•  AAW - SIL, HIL, AIL (Class I-S – 2002-2005) 
–  OBES, closed-loop control laws & control law improvements 
–  Hardware 1553 bus monitors, extensive recording capability & 
simulated PCM stream with IADS for data monitoring 
–  Initially (1) RC engineer required during test and (2) RC engineers 
for review 
–  Changed to (3) RC engineers for test and real-time review (except 
for time history and frequency responses which required post test 
analysis) 5 
X-29 No. 2 Software Testing Team/Schedule 
•  Team 
–  Flight Systems 
•  D. McBride, M. Earls, L. Ramey, J. Sitz, M. Thomson, and T. Vernon 
–  Flight Controls 
•  B. Clarke, F. Webster, J. Bauer, M. Brenner, J. Burken, and J. Ellinwood 
–  Simulation Engineering and Tech Support 
•  M. Pickett, D. Logan, and D. Simon 
–  Pilots 
•  S. Ishmael, D. Purifoy, R. Smith, and R. Wormer 
•  Schedule 
–  BLK-IX-AA-00 (approximately 28 weeks for testing and reviewing data) 
•  Started March 9, 1989 - Finished September 28, 1989 
–  BLK-IX-AA-01 (approximately 5 weeks for testing and reviewing data) 
•  Started February 22, 1990 - Finished March 27, 1990 
–  BLK-IX-AA-02 (approximately 4 weeks for testing and reviewing data) 
•  Started November 15, 1990 - Finished December 11, 1990  
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AAW Phase I Software Testing Team/Schedule 
•  Team 
–  Flight Systems 
•  J. Baca, M. Earls, P. Gonia, and T. Quach 
–  Flight Controls 
•  B. Clarke, M. Allen, R. Dibley, and B. Reed 
–  Simulation Engineering and Tech Support 
•  M. Pickett, G. Patterson, and L. Kelly 
–  Pilots 
•  D. Ewers & D. Purifoy 
•  Schedule 
–  Phase I (approximately 30 weeks for testing and reviewing data and 8 weeks 
for fixing hardware) 
•  Started November 27, 2001 - Stopped December 3, 2001 
•  Fixed problems with simulation hardware 
•  Re-started February 6, 2002 - Stopped March 14, 2002  
•  Reviewed post-test data 
•  Repeats July 22, 2002 - Finished September 12, 2002 
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AAW Phase II Software Testing Team/Schedule 
•  Team 
–  Flight Systems 
•  J. Baca, M. Earls, F. Reaux, T. Quach, and E. Becker 
–  Flight Controls 
•  B. Clarke, M. Allen, R. Dibley, J. Gera, J. Hodgkinson, C. Diebler,             
I. Anchondo, and A. Matuszeski 
–  Simulation Engineering and Tech Support 
•  M. Pickett, G. Patterson, and L. Kelly 
–  Pilots 
•  D. Ewers & D. Purifoy 
•  Schedule 
–  Phase II (approximately 6 weeks for testing 4 weeks for fixing software) 
•  Started August 11, 2004 - Stopped August 27, 2004 
•  Fixed problem with transient free switches and rudder trim gain 
•  Re-started October 4, 2004 - Finished November 5, 2004 
–  Phase IIA (5 days) 
•  Started March 18, 2005 (Friday) - Finished March 24, 2005 (Thursday) 
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Software Development Role 
•  Develop flight control system design 
–  Normal control system (or backup) 
•  Everything – “The whole enchilada”, ex. X-56A:  J. Schaefer 
•  New portion of the flight envelope (such as high angle of 
attack), ex. X-29 No. 2:  R. Clarke/F. Webster 
•  Limited scope update to existing control laws (usually to fix a 
problem or optimize the control response) 
–  Specialized research control system 
•  Research Flight Control System (RFCS) - may or may not be 
safety critical, ex. AAW:  R. Dibley, et. al. 
•  Quicker updates to the control laws typically allowed, 
especially if the control system is not safety critical 
Software Testing Role 
•  Assist in the development of the test matrix 
–  Help to choose the flight conditions for testing 
–  Pick flight conditions that have been shown to have 
small margin(s) or would otherwise exhibit the most 
critical response(s) 
–  Provide assessment of Failure Modes and Effects 
Test (FMET) test points and relationship to critical 
flight conditions 
–  Assist in the development of piloted simulation test 
plans, execution, and data analysis 
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X-29 AIL Tests 
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AAW Design Test Points 
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Software Testing Role 
•  Assist in verification testing (particularly for the 
control law parts of the system) 
–  Verified the AAW Control Law Design Description 
(CLDD) text against the CLDD block diagrams  
–  Verified Matrix-X block diagrams against the AAW 
CLDD block diagrams 
–  Verified that each control system Configuration 
Change Request (CCR) had been implemented  
–  Participate in AAW code walk-thru of the Phase II 
Matrix-X autocoded Ada control laws (comparison 
against CLDD) 
–  Documented in a Code Inspection Issue log 
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Software Testing Role 
•  Assist in development of analysis tools (if new 
ones are needed) 
–  Modified generic linearizer to work on X-29 project (X-29 
1983)  
–  Incorporated FFT and getData I/O routines into Fortran 
“Classic” Matlab to compute frequency response from 
simulation data files (X-29 1988) 
–  Built stand-alone program, called “getdiff”, to compare 
getData files (X-33 1997) 
–  Built Matlab routines to decode 1553 bus messages 
(AAW 2001) 
–  Incorporated IADS displays into sim lab and developed 
special displays (AAW 2004) 
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AAW Phase II RFCS Envelopes 
slow fast 
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low 
altitude 
high 
altitude current a/c 
conditions 
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envelope engage 
envelope 
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Software Testing Role (Continued) 
•  Assist in assessment of the fidelity of the aircraft 
simulation(s) and help make improvements 
–  Assess the fidelity of individual simulation model(s) 
•  Compare with hardware test data (if available) 
•  Compare with independent models 
–  Assist in the development of higher fidelity model(s) as required 
•  Provide actual code or block diagram implementation 
•  Provide check cases 
•  Provide model dispersion data (if required) 
•  Review check case comparisons and sign STR’s 
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Simulation Model Assess/Update/Test 
•  X-29 
–  Flight control system 
–  Actuators - hydraulic system 
–  Sensors - air data 
–  Miscellaneous - mass properties & inlet ram drag 
•  X-33 
–  Flight control system 
–  Actuators - EMA & pneumatic 
–  Miscellaneous - gravity, geodetic, mass properties, landing gear model 
•  AAW 
–  Flight control system 
–  Actuators - hinge moments 
–  Sensors - air data probes 
–  Miscellaneous - air data computer, aerodynamic model 
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Software Testing Role (Continued) 
•  Compare time history and frequency response 
data (verification testing) 
–  Generate the independent data (usually from 
Matlab or Matrix-X) 
–  Collect the hardware-in-the-loop simulation data and 
plot along with simulation results 
–  Review and interpret results 
–  Provide assessment in writing of the results 
18 
Software Testing Role (Continued) 
•  Provide the piloting function during all aspects of testing 
(validation testing) 
–  This allows the systems engineer to concentrate on verification 
of the proper test results 
–  It provides the flight controls engineer an opportunity to see first-
hand the airplane response (from the pilot’s point of view) 
–  The flight controls engineer shall assess the airplane response 
and validate that the response is proper and correct 
•  Subjective assessment 
•  Look for things that don’t “feel right” 
•  Write DR’s as required if problems are found in the simulation 
–  Recognize limits on piloting ability and call in “real pilots” as 
required 
–  Provide assessment in writing of significant deviations from the 
“expected response” 
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Software Testing Role (Continued) 
•  Assist in fixing problems in the FCS as required 
–  Discover 
–  Understand 
–  Design 
–  Analyze 
–  Implement (This one is done by the flight systems 
engineers!) 
–  Test 
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Software Testing Role (Continued) 
•  Sign off on individual V&V STR’s 
–  Is the airplane “Safe to Fly” with the Flying Qualities 
(not Handling Qualities) that have been seen in the 
simulation? 
–  Have new Hazards been identified? Are any of the 
hazards worse than previously thought? 
–  Are piloting aids (LSPI), warning indications (aural 
tone), and procedures adequate? 
–  Are additional ones needed or does the design 
require changes? 
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X-29 System Test Report 
and Test Procedures 
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AAW System Test Report 
and Test Procedures 
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Story Time 
•  Some examples of simulation model updates 
–  X-33 mass properties model 
–  AAW aerodynamic model update 
 
•  Some examples of problems found in previous tests 
–  Undetected dual null roll-rate gyro failure leading to loss of 
control (X-29)  
–  Air data within tolerance failures leading to control system 
instability (X-29) 
–  Data anomalies in HIL (F/A-18 AAW) 
–  Aerodynamic instability due to highly nonlinear pitching 
moment (F/A-18 AAW) 
–  Not so transient free switches (F/A-18 AAW) 
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X-33 Mass Properties Model 
B
Normal to fluid surface
+axb
-azb
( )B = tan-1 +axb-azb
Vehicle reference axis
 
•  Tank designers 
(Structures) provided 
model in terms of pitch 
and roll attitude 
•  Needed to translate 
from static attitude based 
model to dynamic 
acceleration based model 
•  Model did not include 
slosh dynamics 
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AAW Aerodynamic Model Update 
•  AAW aerodynamics needed to be updated at the 18 
flight conditions which would be tested with new 
control law designs 
–  In-flight PID results showed substantial error in some aero 
coefficients when compared with Boeing baseline 
–  Needed aero model update for control law design, not just 
for a report 
–  Needed simulation to match small PID inputs and larger 
amplitude maneuvers 
–  Previous SRA aero model update (Phase 0) used only 
small PID maneuvers and utilized CPT measurements of 
control surface positions 
–  As part of Phase II activity an AAW Aerodynamic Model 
Sensitivity Analysis/Failure Analysis report was produced 
examining the NASA design using Monte Carlo methods 26 
F/A-18 AAW Control Surfaces 
Trailing edge flap	

+45°/-8°    18°/s	

Aileron	

+45°/-25°    100°/s (no-load rate limit)	

Inboard leading edge flap	

+34°/-5°    15°/s	

Outboard leading edge flap	

+34°/-10°    45°/s	

Rudder	

± 30°    56°/s	

Stabilator	

+10.5°/-24°    40°/s	
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AAW OBES Pitch Doublets 
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AAW OBES Roll Doublets 
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Aileron actuator	

(LVDT & inboard CPT)	
 Aileron free hinge	

(outboard CPT)	

AAW Aileron Details 
30 
AAW Aileron Flexibility 
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X-29 Undetected Dual Null Roll Rate Gyro 
Failure Leading to Loss of Control 
•  RF engineer identified that dual roll rate gyros failed to 
null results in loss of roll rate feedback resulting in 
unacceptable roll PIO (1984) 
•  Carried as a Cat I/D hazard by the X-29 program until 
July 1990 when the project desired to fly to the Dayton 
and Oshkosh airshows for static display (flight without 
control room monitoring) 
•  In-flight incident with failed roll rate gyro was still on 
everyone’s mind (so no pushback on the probability 
estimate of the hazard would be allowed) 
•  Severity had to be reduced or airshows were out 
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What We Discovered 
•  The problem was caused by loss of roll rate feedback and the 
forward-loop integrator (With no feedback, pilot control changes 
from rate command to acceleration command!) 
•  Once this was known, a fix was possible (using only procedures) 
–  Pilot could recognize the problem with (3) sensor lights, (3) AR 
lights, degraded normal indications, and horrible flying qualities in 
the roll axis 
–  Without roll rate feedback the AHRS analytic monitor would not 
track and AHRS would be failed 
•  Without AHRS speed stability will no longer engage 
•  No speed stability will affect the landing, but simulation still 
showed 15 knot crosswind was still no problem 
–  Pilot needed to select TW 9 and get his airspeed below 300 knots 
–  Get wings level and stay out of the loop until airspeed dropped 
below 300, where the forward-loop integrator drops out 
–  At that point the control reverts to rate command again 
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X-29 Cockpit (Ship No. 2) 
(3) Sensor lights 
(3) AR lights 
Select TW 9 
Degraded Normal 
Indication 
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X-29 Air Data Within Tolerance 
Failures and Control System Instability 
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X-29 Air Data Within Tolerance 
Failures and Control System Instability 
Chronology  
•  July 11, 1984 - DR002  
–  Undetected null second PT fail caused limit cycle at 0.59/5K.  Trip level 9.8 in.Hg. 
•  October 1984 
–  Changed trip level to 5.0 in.Hg. and the system passed the tests 
•  December 14, 1984 - First flight  
•  February 1986 - CCR148 (Flight 38) 
–  Large sideprobe errors, f(M,α,β), caused selection of sideprobes for gain 
scheduling which resulted in reduced transonic stability margins 
–  Logic was changed to compare the noseboom against the selected mid value 
and choose the noseboom value if it was “ok” (within tolerance of this mid 
value), otherwise use an average of the sideprobes 
•  July 27, 1988 - DR283 
–  Single failure to null of noseboom air data causes loss of control 
•  August 17, 1988 - CCR446 
–  Add bias of 1.5 in.Hg. To sideprobe corrected measurements of PT 
–  Change PS trip level to 1.5 in.Hg. (from 2.5 in.Hg.) 
–  Change PT trip level to 2.0 in.Hg. (from 5.0 in.Hg.) 
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X-29 Air Data Configuration 
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X-29 Typical Pitch Axis Bode Plot 
-ΔQC 
+ΔQC 
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X-29 Flight Test Data 
This is about -0.3 in.Hg., but worst case was found to be 1.3 in.Hg.  
M=0.33, h=20,000ft 
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X-29 Baseline Pitch Axis Gain Margin 
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X-29 Air Data Sensitivity Analysis 
ΔQC = -1.5 in.Hg. High Frequency Gain Margin 
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X-29 Air Data Sensitivity Analysis  
ΔQC = +1.5 in.Hg. Low Frequency Gain Margin 
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X-29 Air Data System 
What We Found Out Several Years Later 
EC 91 501-22 
X-29 No. 2  Flight 107  13:06:05.500  α=9.7°, β=0° M=0.294 
Air Data Probe 
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AAW Data Anomalies in Phase I HIL 
RC Engineer’s Record Book Entries 
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AAW Data Dropouts in the High-Speed 
Fiber-Optic Simulation to Hardware Interface 
•  Nuisance at first which grew to “Must fix before testing can continue!”  
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AAW Phase II Transient Free Switch 
RC Engineer’s Record Book Entries 
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AAW Transient Free Switch 
Block Diagram 
701 TEF 
cmd 
Z1 
TFS #1 20 to 80 
Averager Delay 
20 Hz       80 Hz 
RFCS cmd 
Z2 
TFS #2 
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Not-So-Transient Free Switch 
•  Let X1 be the input prior to switching, X2 be the input after switching, TF is 
the transition time in seconds, t is the time in seconds, and t = 0 at the time 
of switching  
•  Let Z be the output and Δ = X1-X2 at the time of switching (Δ shall remain 
constant after switching) 
•  Z = {  X2 + Δ(1-t/ TF);  t < TF 
  X2;   t ≥ TF} 
X1 
X2 
Z TFS #1 
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AAW 20 to 80 Averager 
•  Let Xn be the current input, Xn-1 be the previous input and Δ = (Xn-Xn-1)/4, at 
20 Hz 
•  Let the current output, Yn = Yn-1 + Δ, at 80 Hz 
Xn 
Xn-1 
Yn 20 to 80 
Averager Delay 
20 Hz       80 Hz 
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Second Transient Free Switch 
•  Let X1 be the input prior to switching, X2 be the input after switching, TF is 
the transition time in seconds, t is the time in seconds, and t = 0 at the time 
of switching  
•  Let Z be the output and Δ = X1-X2 (X1 shall remain constant from the time 
of switching, but X2 can vary) 
•  Z = {  X2 + Δ(1-t/ TF);  t < TF 
  X2;   t ≥ TF} 
X1 
X2 
Z TFS #2 
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AAW TFS Model Response Compared 
with Sim Lab Results 
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AAW TFS Model Response Compared 
with Sim Lab Results 
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AAW TFS Model Response Compared 
with Sim Lab Results 
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Discussion 
•  Questions 
•  Comments 
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